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The Changing Status of Unionism
Around the World 
Some Emerging Patterns
Richard B. Freeman 
Harvard University
and 
National Bureau of Economic Research
Around the world? The whole world? The title obviously promises 
more than I will deliver, particularly for the 1980s when unionism is 
changing differently across countries: losing ground in the United States, 
Japan, and some European countries; seeking to revamp industrial rela 
tions practices in Australia; maintaining high levels of representation 
in Sweden, Belgium, and Denmark after substantial growth in the 1970s; 
achieving free and independent status in Spain and Korea and briefly 
in Communist Poland as part of demoralization; organizing mass pro 
tests in South Africa and Namibia; and showing glimmers of playing 
a greater role in Communist countries. As I have neither the space nor 
competence to cover the world in its entirety, I will concentrate on 
emerging patterns in countries about which I have firsthand knowledge 
and limit myself to brief speculative comments on changes elsewhere. 
Three questions guide my investigation.
Is the deunionization that characterizes the United States a "necessary" 
feature of advanced postindustrial capitalism?
What forms of unionism have fared best in the postoil shock economic 
environment?
Where are the most significant changes in unionism likely to occur 
in the next decade or so?
My answers to these questions are based on the following findings 
of fact and observations.
(1) There is a growing divergence in the rates of unionization among 
developed OECD economies, with union density falling sharply in some
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places while reaching unprecedented peaks in others. If the trends of 
the 1980s continue, the Western world will be divided between coun 
tries with strong trade union movements that participate in national 
economic policymaking, as in Scandinavia, and countries with "ghet 
to unionism," where organization is limited to a small segment of 
workers, as in the United States.
(2) The divergence results in large part from the degree to which coun 
try differences in the legal and institutional features of industrial rela 
tions give employers the incentive and opportunity to oppose unioniza 
tion of their workers, not to "inexorable" economic changes.
(3) Increased competition due to foreign trade, capital mobility, and 
deregulation of markets has reduced the ability of unions to raise wages 
in manufacturing, shifting the locus of unionism in some countries to 
public sector or white-collar workers, and creating a situation in which 
unions do best in neo-corporatist settings where they participate with 
management and government in determining national economic policy.
(4) A major barrier to reforming communist economies are old-line 
managers and party functionaries, whose skills and experience make 
them more adept at dealing with a command economy than with market 
institutions, and whose stake in the command system impels them to 
throttle efforts to free markets. As workers are the only group with the 
potential to challenge these bureaucrats at the enterprise level, unions, 
either reformed official unions or new independent unions, have a poten 
tially important role to play in "perestroika."
On the basis of these facts and observations I conclude that:
  there is nothing about advanced capitalism that necessitates United 
States-style declines in unionism;
  unions do better where they take a macroeconomic national 
perspective in neo-corporatist-type settings;
  unions will become increasingly important in the Communist
world.
The remainder of this paper presents the evidence and arguments for 
these claims and lays out the major lesson I draw for understanding 
industrial relations around the world.
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Divergence of Union Density
The first and seemingly simplest claim to document is the differen 
tial change in union representation of workers among developed coun 
tries. Unionism means something different in different settings. It in 
volves collective bargaining with written contracts in the United States; 
national wage-setting in Scandinavia; representation at the company level 
and the Shunto offensive in Japan; many unions at the same workplace 
in France, Belgium, and Italy; and so on. It includes the unemployed 
in some countries (Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden, where unions ad 
minister unemployment insurance benefits) but not in others; and 
membership estimates come from diverse sources (labor force surveys, 
reports by unions, employer surveys, union financial records). The seem 
ingly simple is fraught with problems, however. Even the most careful 
estimates of density provide only crude indicators of union strength and 
must be informed by direct knowledge of institutions so as not to be 
misleading.
This said, Exhibit I records readily available figures from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and other sources on the union proportion of 
nonagricultural wage and salary workers in OECD countries. As ex 
amples of the problems in cross-country comparisons, note the follow 
ing: in Australia, unions enlist half of the workforce but represent vir 
tually all workers before the industrial tribunals that formally set wages; 
in France and Germany, legal extension of agreements between represen 
tative employers and unions gives unions a larger role in wage-setting 
than density figures indicate in France, for example, in the 1980s, 80 
percent of wage workers were covered by legally extended industry 
agreements while only 24 percent had plant-level agreements; 1 in Italy 
and France, membership is vaguer than in many countries and a bit 
of a trade secret among competing organizations, leading me to put ques 
tion marks next to their data. The available measures of density are 
better suited to analyze trends over time, but still are hardly problem- 
free. The United Kingdom figures understate the decline in density in 
the 1980s as some unions exaggerated membership to maintain high 
representation in the Trade Union Congress and Labor Party. The 
American data mix two conflicting trends: the disastrous drop in private
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sector unionism and the relatively late development of public sector 
unionism. The Italian data may exaggerate the downward trend due to 
omission of members of establishment-level unions outside the stan 
dard organizations.
Measurement issues notwithstanding, Exhibit I shows a wide range 
of variation in unionization levels and trends that are unlikely to change 
with better data. From 1970 to 1979, density increased in most coun 
tries, rising 10 or so points in several, but fell in the United States, 
Japan, and Austria. From 1979 to 1985/86, density stabilized in most 
countries but fell in the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, and Italy. Two decades of decline make the United States 
and Japan the centers of deunionization.
The differential trends produced the substantial divergence in unionism 
noted at the outset. Formally, the coefficient of variation of density in 
Exhibit I increased from .31 in 1970 to .39 in 1985/86; the difference 
in the average density between countries in the top and bottom thirds 
of the density distribution rose from 34 percentage points to 49 points 
over the same period; and the share of union members of the countries 
exhibited in the United States and Japan fell from 42 percent in 1970 
to 34 percent in 1985/86 at the same time that the share of wage and 
salary workers in the two countries rose from 50 percent to 54 percent. 2
Note, finally, the differential changes in density between pairs of coun 
tries with similar industrial relations: the United States and Canada; 
the Netherlands and Belgium; the United Kingdom and Ireland. These 
patterns show that diverging trends represent more than disparate 
development of different forms of unionism.
Strike Days Lost
It is important to recognize that cross-country differences in union 
density do not imply similar patterns of differences in labor-management 
conflict, as reflected, say, in strike days lost per year. To the contrary, 
the degree of labor-management conflict is essentially unrelated to union 
density across countries (see Exhibit n). High-density Sweden, for in 
stance, has one of the lowest strike rates in the OECD while moderate- 
density Italy has a high rate and low-density United States has a moderate 
strike rate. Spearman rank order correlations of countries by density
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and strike days lost are effectively zero. 3 As for trends, in contrast to 
the divergence in densities shown in Exhibit I, Exhibit n reveals a modest 
convergence in strike days lost among countries in the 1980s. The reason 
for the differing patterns is simple: strikes reflect the state of labor- 
management relations in a country, not the degree of unionization, and 
countries with high or low levels of unionization can have adversarial 
or cooperative relations.
Accounting for the Divergence
To determine the causes of the divergence of union density across 
developed countries, I analyze next the leading case of deunionization, 
the United States; I consider the relevance of my explanation to the 
United Kingdom and Japan; and I explore some of the causes of union 
growth in Western Europe, particularly Scandinavia and Belgium.
Two types of explanations have been advanced to account for the fall 
in density in the United States: "nonconflictual" explanations that at 
tribute the fall to structural changes in advanced capitalist economies; 
and "conflictual" explanations that stress management antiunion cam 
paigns in an institutional setting where employers influence decisively 
the outcome of organizing drives.
My reading of the cross-country and within-country evidence leads 
me to reject the nonconflictual explanation of the decline in unioniza 
tion in the United States and elsewhere in favor of the conflictual 
explanation.
Nonconflictual Explanations
The principal factors suggested here are shifts in the composition of 
employment toward traditionally nonunion jobs and types of workers, 
a worsened public image of unions, increased government protective 
labor regulations that provide an alternative to unionism, and declining 
worker desire for unions as a result of high wages and good working 
conditions, i.e., "positive industrial relations" in many companies.
The hypothesis that shifts in the composition of employment toward 
white-collar and service-sector jobs and female and more educated
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workers is the prime reason for the decline in density in the United States 
runs counter to the basic fact that workforces throughout the 
developed world have experienced similar compositional changes without 
deunionizing. 4 As a case in point take Canada, where many of the same 
firms and unions operate in a similar industrial relations system as in 
the United States and which had comparable changes in the composi 
tion of employment as the United States but where union density has 
grown rather than fallen. As can be seen in Exhibit in, the difference 
between the United States and Canada lies within sectors: density in 
creased in most one-digit industries in Canada while dropping in one- 
digit industries in the United States. Measures of density by industry 
for Japan also show substantial changes within sectors. Finally, collec 
tive bargaining coverage figures for the United Kingdom show falls in 
coverage for almost all sectors from 1973 to 1985 (Pelletier and Freeman 
1988). In these countries and in the United States the fundamental reason 
for falling density appears to be union failure to organize new plants 
and industries. 5
Two pieces of international comparative data contravene Lipset's 
public image explanation of changes in union density: opinion polls of 
attitudes toward unions in some Western European countries that reveal 
as poor a public image of unions as in the United States without any 
decline in density; and 1980s opinion polls for the United Kingdom that 
show attitudes toward unionism becoming more favorable during the 
1980s drop in density! Time series data for the United States also gain 
say the public image argument, showing no drop in public approval 
of unions between 1972 and 1985, when density fell sharply. 6
The argument that unionism is declining because governmental regula 
tions substitute for union protection of workers at workplaces (Neumann 
and Rissman 1984) is inconsistent with cross-country evidence that 
unionism has remained strong in Scandinavia and other European coun 
tries with highly regulated markets. It also runs counter to: the ac 
celerated decline in density in the United States during the Reagan ad 
ministration, which eased labor regulations; the turnaround in density 
in the United Kingdom under the Thatcher government; the great desire 
for unions by black Americans, who receive special legal protection 
against discrimination; and the success of unions in states with the
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greatest legal protection of workers (Freeman 1987; Block, Mahoney, 
and Corbit 1987. The argument that unionism and government regula 
tion are substitutes is flawed because it fails to recognize that "enact 
ing a law and securing the realization of the purpose the law is aimed 
to secure are two vastly different matters" (Gompers 1965, p. 54). To 
benefit from legal regulation, workers need a union or union-like agency 
to monitor compliance at the shop floor.
The claim that increasing numbers of workers in the United States 
reject unions because they enjoy improved wages and working condi 
tions is inconsistent with survey data showing that the proportion of 
nonunion workers wanting to be represented by a union remained roughly 
constant at one-third between 1973 (Quality of Employment Survey) 
and 1985 (Harris Survey). 7 Over the same period that density fell in 
the private sector, moreover, it increased in the public sector, highly 
unlikely if workers in general had freely decided that unionism was not 
in their interest. And the 1970s and 1980s were hardly a bellwether 
period of rapid growth of real wages and living standards.
In sum, the nonconflictual explanations for the decline in unionism 
in the United States and other countries is inconsistent with interna 
tional comparisons and detailed within-country evidence.
Conflictual Explanations
My analysis and that of others (Farber 1987; Dickens and Leonard 
1985; Goldfield 1987) suggests that the major single cause for the de- 
unionization of the private sector of the United States is to be found 
on the other side of the ledger: in the behavior of management operating 
in an institutional setting that allows virulent campaigns against union 
organizing drives. In the 1980s, the vast majority of firms that faced 
a National Labor Relations Board representation election (the 
government-run secret ballot process by which American workers can 
chose to unionize) sought to forestall unionization in various ways; by 
aggressive lawful efforts to persuade /pressure workers to reject unions; 
by committing unfair labor practices that include firing union activists; 
and by adopting "positive labor relations" that use the carrot of 
company-created union work conditions, such as seniority and grievance 
procedures, to deter unionization of their employees. Indicative of the 
pervasiveness of the corporate antiunion campaign, 45 percent of the
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relatively progressive companies in the Conference Board's Personnel 
Forum declared in 1983 that their main labor goal was to operate ' 'union- 
free" (Kochan, McKersie, and Chalykoff 1986), a far cry from the 1950s 
and 1960s when most large firms accepted unions at the workplace. 
With the exception of one study whose results were reversed in a 
reanalysis, every investigation with which I am familiar shows manage 
ment opposition to be a decisive factor in NLRB election outcomes 
(Freeman 1988). My analyses suggest, moreover, that management op 
position is the single most important factor in the downward trend in 
unionization (Freeman 1986, 1988).
Why has American management declared war on unions? One reason 
is the increased cost of unionization to firms due to the growth of the 
union wage premium in the 1970s and greater product market com 
petition due to trade, deregulation and other factors. A second reason 
is the growth of a market-oriented ideology in which managers view 
unions solely as an impediment to flexibility and believe that "anything 
goes" in stopping them. A third reason is that labor laws allow exten 
sive management campaigning against unionization and impose only 
minimal penalties for illegal antiunion practices. In Canada, where labor 
law severely limits the opportunity for management to fight unions, in 
some provinces by certifying unions after card checks rather than after 
adversarial elections (Weiler 1983), union density has gone from below 
the levels in the United States to nearly twice the American levels.
Legal and institutional factors also appear to be important in changes 
in density in the United Kingdom. In the 1970s, density rose with the 
favorable legislation of the Labor party. In the 1980s, it fell with the 
unfavorable legislation of the Thatcher government. By contrast, in the 
closest comparison country, Ireland, laws governing industrial relations 
did not change and union density trended modestly upward in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Pelletier 1988).
Countries with Increasing Density
What about countries where union density reached unprecedented 
peaks in the period under study? Why did unions in Scandinavia and 
Belgium, in particular, grow so much in the 1970s and maintain high 
representation in the 1980s?
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The conflictual analysis suggests that hi those settings management 
opposition to unionism must be significantly muted and/or that labor 
laws and institutions limit management's role in determining union status.
The prime factor that mutes management opposition is centralization 
of wage negotiations. Countries in which unions and management engage 
in centralized bargaining, so-called neo-corporatist systems, had the 
greatest increases in density even though they were already highly 
organized in 1970 (Exhibit IV). In these settings, managements form 
employers' federations that not only accept unions but often pressure 
nonunion firms to recognize them also, presumably to assure comparable 
wages in the labor market. Indicative of management's stance in these 
countries, none of the Danish businessmen and representatives of the 
employer federations whom I interviewed in summer 1987, including 
spokesmen for small businesses, expressed opposition to unions and 
collective bargaining. The notion that business should engage in a jihad 
for a union-free environment as in the United States was anathema to 
the Danes, as it is to management in Sweden, Belgium, and most of 
Western Europe.
In addition to factors that take management out of the organizing pro 
cess other institutional forces contributed to the increased union densi 
ty in the countries at the top of Exhibit I. For historical reasons, Belgian, 
Swedish, and Danish unions distribute government-funded unemploy 
ment benefits. In the high unemployment 1980s workers who lost jobs 
maintained union membership, stabilizing the numerator but not the 
denominator in the density statistic. The role of unions in delivering 
unemployment insurance is a key factor in the differing trend in unioniza 
tion between Belgium and neighboring Netherlands, where unions do 
not play such a role.
Regression Analysis
To evaluate the quantitative impact of the above factors on changes 
in union density, I estimated a cross-country time series regression model 
linking compound annual changes in density to corporatist industrial 
relations, to union delivery of unemployment benefits interacted with
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the unemployment rate, and to three macro variables that are often view 
ed as affecting unionization: the unemployment rate, inflation, and the 
growth of gross national product. Because density is bounded between 
0 and 1 the calculations use a log odds ratio form as well as a simple 
linear form:
Dp or Dln(p/l-p)=a+b INF+c DUNE+d UI*DUNE+e CORP+d 
Z+u, where
D = change in variable
p = union density
INF =ln change in prices
UNE =rate of unemployment
UI = dummy variable if unions deliver unemployment benefits
CORP=dummy variable if country has "corporatist" industrial 
relations
Z = set of control variables that includes growth of employment 
and growth of GNP per capita, and the time period covered.
The analysis treats annual changes from 1973 to 1985 in a single pooled 
sample, with dummy variables for individual years to allow for time 
effects.
The basic regression estimates, summarized in Exhibit V, show that 
with other factors held fixed, density grew more in countries with cor 
poratist industrial relations; in countries with rising unemployment when 
unions deliver unemployment benefits; and where inflation was rapid. 
By contrast, neither unemployment nor growth of GNP had any discer 
nible impact on density.
The results of Exhibits I-V provide support for the claim that the 
institutions that govern labor relations rather than broad-based economic 
forces determine the changing cross-country pattern of unionism. Where 
management has a profit incentive to oppose unions and plays a key 
role in organizing, as in the United States, density fell. Where manage 
ment has less incentive to oppose unions, as in corporatist-style 
economies, or where management is restricted in its ability to influence 
organizing, as in Canada, density increased or stabilized.
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Unions and Union Leadership
"But where is Hamlet? Aren't unions and their leaders at 
least partially responsible for declining union densities?"
At first sight there is much to criticize in the 1970s and 1980s per 
formance of unions in the rapidly deunionizing United States. Organizing 
activity did not keep pace with the growth of the workforce; unions 
contested fewer NLRB elections annually than in the 1960s; most drives 
were in existing areas of union strength rather than in growing sectors 
of the economy (Voos 1983); and the major AFL-CIO effort to enroll 
new workers, the 1980s Houston Project bombed abysmally. Looked 
at from the perspective of standard marginal analysis, however, union 
failure to invest in organizing looks very much like rational optimizing 
behavior in response to increases in the cost of winning new members. 
In an environment where management opposition can readily defeat 
organizing drives, it simply does not pay unions to risk members' dues 
on expensive representation campaigns, save for close competitors to 
currently organized firms. And once density starts dropping, the cost 
to existing members of unionizing an additional percent of the workforce 
rises. Finally, while some might blame American unions for the 1970s 
wage increases that put competitive pressure on employers and stimulated 
management opposition, American unions were among the first to give 
wage concessions and stress job security once the employment conse 
quences of the 1970s wage gains became clear.
Still, one aspect of the behavior of unions and their leaders in the 
period cannot be defended: this is the slow, even sluggish, recognition 
of the reality and importance of declining density and consequent delayed 
search for remedies to the problem. In the 1970s many top leaders 
downplayed falling density on the grounds that absolute membership 
was stable and that all would be well if only the economy started to 
boom. Not until the 1985 report, "The Changing Situation of Workers 
and their Unions" did the top AFL-CIO leadership address seriously 
the moribund state of the union movement in the private sector. Since 
then, national unions have been slow to adopt the "evolutionary 
blueprint" laid out in the Report. While many have signed for union 
Mastercards with their attractively low rates of interest (McDonald
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1987), none has actively pursued the key recommendation to create new 
forms of membership outside the collective bargaining structure.
The contrast with unions in other countries is striking. In Australia, 
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) sought to transform 
Australian industrial relations from its historic confrontational British- 
style system to a Scandinavian corporatist system, in part to preempt 
growing antiunion management sentiment that might fuel United States 
or United Kingdom type problems. The secretary-treasurer of the AC 
TU was doing his best in the mid-1980s to convince constituent unions 
to accept a national wages accord that required lower settlements than 
some unions could get. The difference between the American and 
Australian union responses was forcefully brought home to me at a 1988 
Harvard Trade Union Program seminar where Australian unionists 
mocked as ridiculously inadequate the changes proposed, though often 
not implemented, by American unions. "Never work, mate." "It's like 
your beer, piss-poor." were representative comments.
While not as striking as the Australian union effort, the 1987 
reorganization of Japanese trade union federations also goes beyond 
what American unions have initiated at this writing. In Japan, the private 
sector unions formed a new federation to take the lead in the union move 
ment from the more politicized public sector unions.
Even in the United Kingdom, where the past seems to restrict union 
thinking and behavior to a greater extent than elsewhere, there have 
been substantially greater changes than in the United States: the split 
of the Miners Union; the development of cooperative single plant/single 
union bargaining strategies by the Electricians and Engineering unions; 
new efforts to enlist part-time workers by the Boilermakers, among 
others. And, at this writing, there is talk of the potential break-up of 
the Trade Union Congress.
Finally, in Scandinavia and Belgium unions have been in the forefront 
of economic debate on broad macroeconomic issues that unions in the 
United States rarely address, such as the exchange rate of national cur 
rency. American unions lacked the expertise and credibility to be an 
effective voice against the 1980s overvalued dollar that was a more im 
portant determinant of the well-being of members in many industries 
than any collective bargaining agreement.
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What explains the slow and inadequate American union response to 
the crisis of declining density?
A major factor in my view is the otherwise admirable decentralized 
structure of the American union movement. In the United States, organiz 
ed labor consists of some 90 or so independent national unions in the 
AFL-CIO and others outside the federation. Each national has its own 
problems and agenda. Each contains hundreds of independent locals 
with their own concerns. Such a structure concentrates union efforts 
on local or sectoral rather than national issues, guaranteeing slow reaction 
to problems that affect unionism in its entirety, and making implemen 
tation of reforms suggested by the AFL-CIO leadership problematic 
at best. Without the career option of moving into government, as in 
countries with labor parties, American union leadership may turn over 
too slowly and appears to be more risk averse than suits a crisis period.
New Behavior in a New Environment
The cross-country evidence that economic changes are compatible 
with high or increasing union density does not mean that unions can 
operate in the economic environment of the 1980s as they have in the 
past. To the contrary, the shifts in employment to traditionally less 
unionized groups, intense product market competition, and continued 
high unemployment in much of Europe require unions to alter tradi 
tional modes of operating in various ways.
The shifts of the workforce requires adjustment in bargaining goals. 
White-collar workers are often more interested in having a say at the 
workplace, in job flexibility, fairness in promotions, and the like (the 
* 'collective voice'' aspects of unionism of What Do Unions Do ?), than 
in establishing contractual rules that limit management arbitrariness and 
abuse of power. Part-time workers want different fringe benefits from 
full-time workers. Women workers are concerned with pay equity, day 
care facilities, maternity leave, and obtaining compensation packages 
that complement those their husbands receive. All this means that unions 
have to modify traditional demands, as they are doing throughout the 
West, with varying degrees of success.
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Increases in product market competition due to world trade, deregula 
tion, privatization, and international mobility of capital require more 
significant changes in union behavior. Increased competition raises the 
elasticity of demand for labor, weakening the ability of unions to bargain 
for high wages and improved working conditions without loss of jobs. 
In manufacturing, the growth of world competition means that even 
100 percent organization of domestic employers no longer "takes wages 
out of competition" as it once did in many countries. To improve wages, 
unions must help create margins for gains either by raising productivi 
ty and competitiveness through, say, improved effort at workplaces, 
bargaining over investment decisions, or innovative wage payments such 
as profit sharing, or by coordinated bargaining across national lines. 
In the service sector, by contrast, union strength still depends on organiz 
ing domestic workers, so that unions can pursue traditional forms of 
bargaining and behavior. As a result, the locus of strength within the 
union movement has begun to shift toward unions in the public sector 
and services in several countries including the United States, Canada, 
and United Kingdom while in Sweden and Denmark the white-collar 
service sector unions have shown an increasing willingness to develop 
their own economic agenda rather than to follow the lead of blue-collar 
manufacturing unions.
The persistently high unemployment rates that developed in much 
of Europe hi the 1980s present unions with a different challenge. As 
expansionary policies risk unsustainable trade imbalances/capital flows 
when initiated by single countries, and as the central bankers and finan 
ciers who dominate economic summits and international policymaking 
are more concerned with inflation than unemployment, the coordinated 
expansion needed to attain full employment will require unions in several 
countries to pressure governments to expand in concert. The develop 
ment of the Common Market and the American-Canadian free trade 
agreement increases the necessity for union coordination across national 
lines.
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Unions in Perestroika
"Transmission belt from the Communist Party to the masses 
or ... ?"
Unions have long created conceptual and practical problems for com 
munist societies. In 1921 when the Tenth Soviet Communist Party Con 
gress debated the status of unions, the Worker's Opposition faction 
argued that unions should be independent of the Community Party and 
should manage parts of the economy while Trotsky and Bukharin argued 
that unions should be subordinate to the Party and state. During the 
New Economic Policy of the 1920s, unions had considerable in 
dependence. But after 1929, Stalin purged the leadership and destroyed 
any semblance of autonomy. The accession of Communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe suppressed free unionism in those countries as well, 
though to differing degress depending on national contexts. In all cases 
the authorities selected union leaders, guaranteeing loyalty to the state 
rather than to workers, used unions to deliver social services such as 
low-cost vacations, restricted the ability of unions to protect workers 
on the job by forbidding strikes de facto if not de jure, and treated unions 
largely as aids to management in spurring production and controlling 
labor. Only during rare periods, such as the Prague Spring of 1968 or 
the Polish protests of 1980, did unions develop that represented workers 
first and foremost.
Will unions in Communist economies remain subordinate institutions 
in an era of political and economic reforms or will "glasnost" and 
"perestroika" lead to a new union role? Was the free and independent 
operation of Solidarity in 1980/81 an aberration or a harbinger of future 
labor relations under communism?
My speculative answer to these questions, based in part on limited 
firsthand knowledge of the Polish situation from a 1987 World Bank 
mission, is that unions or related worker organizations will achieve in 
creasing independence and play a major role in reforming Communist 
economies. Solidarity may not be a realistic model for the future of 
unionism under most Communist regimes, but neither is the "transmis 
sion belt" union of the command economy.
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I expect increasingly independent unionism to go hand-in-hand with 
economic reform of Communist economies for three reasons. First, 
because implementation of reforms requires an enterprise level counter- 
force to the command economy managers and party functionaries who 
dominate Communist economies that only autonomous unions can pro 
vide. As beneficiaries of a command economy, these managers and of 
ficials, Milovan Djilas' "New Class," have much to lose and little to 
gain from market reforms and will accordingly do all they can to stifle 
reforms. Even the highest level leaders such as Gorbachev will need 
allies at the enterprise level to force these officials to change behavior 
or to change jobs pressure that can only come from organized workers, 
either through revitalized official unions or through newly formed in 
dependent unions like Solidarnosc that favor economic reform as the 
only way to improve living standards. Suppressing free unionism, as 
the Jaruzelski regime did in Poland, will turn even nominally signifi 
cant market reforms into dead letters, give the bureaucrats and managers 
a free hand to demand limitations on labor mobility, as they have in 
Poland and Hungary, and lead the rest of society to dismiss the reforms 
as sham. Strange as it may seem to conservative economists who regard 
unions as the archtypical antimarket force, free and independent unions 
are a prerequisite for more market-oriented behavior in command 
economies.
The second reason for expecting greater independent activity by 
workers and unions is that reform communism legitimizes unions car 
rying out their classical defensive function of protecting workers from 
increasingly independent management (including management in private 
enterprises) and creates a new role for them to lobby for workers' in 
terests in a more pluralistic society. Here, the historical record shows 
that reformist communist regimes accept such worker and union ac 
tivity, at least within some bounds; in 1987 thousands of Yugoslav 
workers struck to protest national wages policy without producing police 
repression (New York Times, March 21, 1987); in Poland the official 
unions have denounced government plans to increase the price of food 
and fuel and carried out protest strikes, while the outlawed Solidarnosc 
continues to defend workers at local workplaces and speak up in na 
tional debate; in Hungary unions have at times lobbied the central
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government for economic policies more favorable to workers, including 
wage increases and a greater allocation of national product to consump 
tion (Noti, Pravda and Ruble); in the Soviet Union, as noted earlier, 
unions acted as relatively autonomous organizations during the NEP 
years. In part, reform communist governments permit official unions 
some autonomy to give them legitimacy among workers and to forestall 
truly free and independent unions; in part the governments permit worker 
protests because they recognize the failure of their command economies 
and the consequent need to allow some outlet for worker frustrations 
and anger. Still, whatever the cause, the movement of unions from the 
transmission belt institutuion is clear.
The third reason for expecting freer unionism to develop under reform 
communism is the possibility that such organizations can help spark 
the individual work effort that is necessary for these economies to ad 
vance. My argument here is based on Hirschman's exit-voice analysis, 
which contrasts two mechanisms for dealing with social problems: the 
voice mechanism, by which individuals express their desires through 
political channels; and the exit mechanism, by which they express their 
desires through market mobility. In the labor market, unions are the 
institution of voice and quitting is the normal form of exit (Freeman 
and Medoff 1984). From the perspective of the dichotomy, traditional 
command economies deprive workers of voice by suppressing free unions 
and deprive them of exit by restricting employment to state-run enter 
prises and often by limiting and penalizing mobility among those enter 
prises. The result is that workers have only one way to express discon 
tent with wages and work relations by "exiting" the workplace through 
reductions of effort. While neither the "socialism with a human face" 
experiment in Czechoslovakia nor free and independent Solidarnosc 
unionism in Poland lasted long enough to test whether autonomous unions 
and freer markets can break the "they pretend to pay us, we pretend 
to work" ethos of labor markets under communism, those experiences 
seem to offer the greatest promise for creating a productive workforce.
In sum, my speculative analysis is that reform of Communist 
economies, */it is to proceed successfully, will advance hand-in-hand 
with growing union activity. How independent and free unions will 
become and with what feedback effects on the societies is likely to dif-
128 The Changing Status of Unionism
fer among countries. In some cases, Communist leaders may backtrack 
and suppress unions as a threat to their power, effectively killing reforms, 
as in Poland. In other cases, the dynamics of reform may be cumulative, 
as appeared to be occurring in Czechoslovakia prior to the 1968 inva 
sion. At any rate, expect to see increasingly interesting developments 
on the union front in Communist states in the next decade or so.
Concluding Comments
In their 1964 analysis of labor relations in industrial society, In 
dustrialism and Industrial Man, Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, Frederick 
Harbison, and Charles Meyers argued that the logic of industrialism 
was producing a convergence in labor relations among countries, while 
allowing for pluralistic industrialism along some dimensions: "the more 
we look . . . the more impressed we become with the power of the forces 
for uniformity." If there is a broad generalization that emerges from 
the review of the changing patterns of unionism in the world in this 
essay, it is the opposite: that at the level of labor market institutions 
examined here labor relations is not converging toward a single institu 
tional mode across countries, nor necessarily toward a stable pattern 
within countries. In a world of economic and social flux, structuring 
labor relations should not be viewed as a once-and-for-all process of 
setting up procedures and institutions. Rather, it is more properly viewed 
as a process that must be undertaken time and again as changes occur 
in the balance of power between workers and management and in their 
conflicting and coinciding interests. There is no rest in the practice or 
study of industrial relations.
NOTES
1. These figures are from Ministere du Travail, De L'Emploi et de la Formation 
Professionelle, Tableaux Statistiques (Paris: 1986). The data further show that only 9.9 
percent of establishments had plant level agreements while 76.9 percent were covered 
by branch/industry level agreements.
2. I calculated the coefficient of variation for 1985/86 using 1979 densities for 
Belgium, France, and New Zealand. The average density for the top six countries was
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65 percent in 1970 and 79 percent in 1985/86 while the average density for the bottom 
six countries was 31 percent in 1970 and 30 percent in 1985/86.1 calculated the United 
States and Japanese shares of wage and salary employees using the data from the Center 
for Labour Economics, OECD Data Set, updated, and with union figures based as much 
as possible on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data. The calculation is crude, using 
figures for the year closest to 1985 for countries with missing data.
3. For example, the rank correlation between working days lost in 1971-82 and density 
in 1979 is a bare 0.10.
4. OECD data show that the shift of employment out of manufacturing, which 
adherents to the structural view cite as a key to the decline in United States unionism, 
was actually larger in OECD Europe than in the United States. See OECD Historical 
Statistics (Paris: 1986).
5. In the United States this shows up hi the precipitous fall hi the number of workers 
organized through NLRB elections. For the United Kingdom, data from the Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey show no change hi union representation among the same 
establishments between 1980 and 1984, which is consistent with the claim in the text 
but there are too few new establishments to provide a clear test (Millward and Stevens 
1986). For Japan, the 88.4 percent of new enterprises in 1985 were nonunion, accord 
ing to the Japan Institute of Labor.
6. Polls reported by Heckscher (1988, p. 258) show a 33 percent rate of confidence 
hi unions in the U.S. compared to 26 percent in the UK, 32 percent in Italy, and 36 
percent in France and Germany. The rise in favorable ratings of unions in the UK is 
documented in Financial Times. Data on approval of unions in the United States are 
given by Lipset (1986).
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SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity and 
Technology, Division of Foreign Labor Statistics and Trade, July 1986; Center for Labour 
Economics, OECD Data Set; and respective country statistical abstracts.
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Exhibit II 













































































SOURCE: Beggs and Chapman; Table 2, countries with * from Creigh (1986), Table 2.3 1962-71 
for 1964-70 and 1972-81 for 1971-82 for countries with *.
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Exhibit IV 














SOURCE: Corporatist countries taken from Crouch (1985). (They include: Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and West Germany.)
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Exhibit V
Impact of Corporatism, Inflation, and Changing Employment





Change hi Change in log odds 
% union ratio of % union 
(/-statistics in parenthesis)
Corporatism (.48) .005 (2.68) .038 (3.80) 
Inflation (.079) .065 (2.60) .409 (2.93) 
Change in
unemployment (.003) -.027 (0.20) -.129 (0.17) 
Change in unemployment
if unions give benefits
(.0008) .750 (3.58) 6.09 (5.23) 
Growth of GNP (.028) -.054 (1.17) -.20 (.76) 
Time -.001 (5.29) -.004 (3.27) 
R-squared .22 .24 
Number of observations 259 259
SOURCE: Calculated from London School of Economics, Center for Labour Economics OECD 
Data Set. Countries where unions give benefits: Denmark, Belgium and Sweden. Corporate coun 
tries, as in Exhibit IV.
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